Returning to any job after a year away always requires a period of adjustment.
It means you have to turn detective on LinkedIn before every meeting to double check the person you are seeing still works where they did a year ago.
You have to remember things you definitely didn't agree to before you went away, as well as fend off numerous requests from 'content' providers to host blogs that do not have anything to do with investment but they argue would be of huge benefit to readers of… (insert incorrect name of publication).
Coming back this time after maternity leave with my second child has also presented some unique challenges as I have tried to get to grips with the annus horribilis for the investment industry that was 2019.
It was an eventful year to be away. I observed the fallout from the collapse of Neil Woodford's empire from a more detached viewpoint than if I had been covering the story day-by-day for Investment Week but it was still shocking nevertheless.
To see Woodford doorstepped by the BBC's Panorama programme seemed unbelievable considering the highs of his career just a few short years before.
His fall has undoubtedly caused huge reputational damage to the fund management industry.
Woodford was the most well-known fund manager in the UK and for some retail investors the only manager they had ever heard of. For him to fail so publicly is a big blow and there are clearly serious longer-term implications as investors' trust in our industry is at rock-bottom levels not seen since the financial crisis.
I do not know if Woodford realises the extent of the damage he has caused, but his ill-timed trip to China to weigh up new business opportunities while investors remained locked in his funds suggests not.
Many column inches were written about Woodford's demise last year but I suppose what I am most interested in on my return is the industry's response. I sense there are some difficulties here.
Come out too strongly fighting the sector's corner and you risk being seen as dismissive of investors' concerns. Don't say anything and you perpetuate the belief Woodford's issues are systemic.
Many of our fund selector readers would argue they had heeded the warning signs about Woodford long before the end came.
However, this is cold comfort to the retail investors trapped in Woodford funds, many of whom had been totally unaware of the extent of the problems.
So how does the industry rehabilitate its image in 2020 and beyond and fight claims fund management is full of gamblers recklessly betting away life savings?
I think it is only right that certain long-standing issues are coming under the spotlight again following Woodford's collapse, with further debate between key stakeholders on open-ended fund liquidity rules as well as the influence of best buy lists.
I have noticed many more fund groups talking about portfolio liquidity as a matter of course now in presentations and they are far more aware of their client bases and their needs.
I am sure the Woodford debacle and the suspension of a couple of property funds at the end of last year has only led to more rigorous stress testing of portfolios and this is to be welcomed.
A lack of challenge at Woodford Investment Management also played a major role in the firm's collapse and here it will be up to the industry to show how the introduction of iNEDs can help make a difference, as well as bumping up pressure on ACDs.
Woodford was an extreme case but surely there now needs to be renewed challenge across the board.
These measures could go some way to shoring up the industry against future problems in these areas but maybe we also need a back-to-basics approach too when it comes to explaining the role of a good active fund manager.
The industry reality is the majority of fund managers are long-term investors and stewards of capital making considered decisions about companies they know extremely well.
This may not be headline grabbing stuff, but perhaps it needs to be if the industry is to regain any kind of trust in a post-Woodford world.